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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

Note verbale dated 20 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Belize to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Belize to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Committee of the Security Council established by resolution 1540 (2004) and has the honour to transmit herewith the national report of the Government of Belize pursuant to said resolution.

The Permanent Mission of Belize would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

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Annex to the letter dated 20 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Belize to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

Report of the Government of Belize pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

Belize is pleased to report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) of its actions in regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons particularly as it relates to the implementation of said resolution.

At the outset, Belize confirms that it does not provide any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Belize is firmly committed to international efforts for arms control and disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, Belize is a party to major multilateral treaties relating to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, including:

- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction

At the national level, Belize is in the process of developing legislation in particular to give effect to the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The proposed Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Bill makes it an offence to develop, produce or use chemical weapons; or to assist with such activities; and otherwise regulates chemical weapons.

The Bill also establishes domestic control to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. In particular, the Bill provides that those dealing with toxic chemicals provide information to the Government and maintain appropriate records. The Government may also seek information or authorize inspections of facilities. Likewise, the Bill has provisions concerning national control lists.

To date, Belize has not yet enacted legislation to give effect to the remaining multilateral treaties relating to disarmament and non-proliferation. The matter of capacity is a recurrent issue.

Nonetheless, Belize remains engaged in dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation issues. Within the larger context of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Belize is presently negotiating with the United States of America for a bilateral agreement on cooperation to suppress the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials by sea.

20 October 2004

Enclosure*

First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities

1. The Chairman noted that the main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the **first report submitted by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team** established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004). He encouraged Committee members to think about how they could provide direction to the Monitoring Team for its future work, as stipulated in the Annex to resolution 1526 (2004), whilst also respecting the Team's independence. In particular, members might consider: the **type and quality of report** they expected from the Team in December; which **case-studies** the Team might undertake; and which issues the Team should explore in-depth. One example of such an in-depth issue was the **written assessment** due by the end of October of Member States' reports submitted pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003). The Chairman hoped to release the report as soon as possible and he proposed convening a joint press-conference with the Coordinator of the 1526 Monitoring Team, in order to present the report to the press.

2. Introducing the report, Mr. Richard Barrett (Coordinator of the 1526 Monitoring Team) noted that the document aimed to set the scene for the Team's subsequent work. Despite the extent of work undertaken in the field of counterterrorism, Al-Qaida and associated terrorist groups were very much "alive and kicking". The nature of the terrorist threat had evolved considerably and there was thus a need to ensure that the response evolved accordingly. The report contained observations relating to the utility of the Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban, as well as in relation to the application of the financial sanctions, arms embargo and travel ban imposed against Al-Qaida and the Taliban. With respect to the **Consolidated List**, there was a pressing need to improve the quality of the List and to engage the international community so as to achieve greater cooperation in listing relevant individuals and entities. With respect to **financial sanctions**, while much had been achieved gaps still remained in the areas of alternative remittance systems, non-profit organizations, and cash couriers. With respect to the **arms embargo** and the **travel ban**, it was necessary to explore why there had as yet been no reported instance either of those measures having prevented listed individuals and entities from gaining access to prohibited arms and related materiel or from crossing international borders.

3. The Coordinator then stressed that it was important for the Monitoring Team to continue to work with Member States and external agencies. The Team was exploring how to maximize such cooperation. Possibilities included undertaking country visits and facilitating the provision of technical assistance. There was also a need to consider how Member States might better inform the 1267 Committee of progress achieved in the sanctions implementation. One idea was to ensure that the questionnaires forwarded to Member States were better tailored. It was also important to foster a greater sense of shared responsibility in the effort to counter the threat of terrorism, including by injecting increased dynamism into the work of the Monitoring Team and the 1267 Committee.

4. Many delegations (Russia, United States, China, Spain, Chile) shared the Team's assessment that the nature of the threat posed by Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities had evolved and that the response should evolve accordingly. A number of delegations (Russia, United States, China, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Romania) also agreed that there should be greater cooperation and coordination

* Annexes are on file with the Secretariat and are available for consultation.

between the 1267, 1373 and 1540 Committees. Germany encouraged the Monitoring Team to focus upon improving the quality and quantity of reports submitted by Member States concerning sanctions implementation. France, echoed by Brazil and Chile, queried why the Team sought (as outlined in para 85 of its report) to bring together a small group of professionals from States with experience, expertise and success in dealing with the problem of terrorism, as the Team would in any case be undertaking country visits. Spain suggested that the currency amounts contained in the report's Annex on frozen assets could be presented in one standardised currency. Referring to the issue of terrorist financing, Chile noted that, while the money required to undertake a terrorist act could be minimal, substantial funding might be needed to sustain the planning and logistics underpinning such acts. Additional attention could thus be focused upon tracing that aspect of terrorist financing.

5. In comments addressing the use of the **Consolidated List**, China, supported by Germany, observed that there was a need to strengthen the List, including by improving the accuracy of the identifying information contained on the List and by increasing the number of Member States that were proposing amendments. The United Kingdom, echoed by Brazil, stressed that in order to be inscribed on the List, individuals and entities must have a genuine link with Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Spain expressed concern that encouraging a substantial increase in the number of names on the List might actually undermine its credibility and effectiveness. Pakistan cautioned that if criteria for listing were applied too loosely there was a danger of emboldening and strengthening the ranks of entities that were not in fact closely associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Germany emphasised that there should be greater due process in the listing and delisting of individuals and entities.

6. Touching upon the application of the **travel ban**, a number of delegations (Russia, China, Benin, Spain, Chile) suggested that greater guidance could be provided to Member States concerning what they should do if they were to detain listed individuals. China noted that international law should be taken into account in providing such guidance. Benin, supported by Spain, observed that there was a need to foster greater cooperation between States with respect to the extradition of detained individuals. The Security Council could play a role by encouraging States to become signatories to extradition treaties. Chile suggested that the matter of asylum should also be explored more closely.

7. Responding to the points raised, the Coordinator agreed that the Monitoring Team could focus further attention on the issues of detention and extradition. He also clarified that the proposal to consult additional national professionals in the area of sanctions implementation aimed to keep to a minimum the practice of drawing upon press reports. Rather, the objective was to collect new data from these practitioners and thus to generate fresh insights and recommendations for improving sanctions implementation. Referring to concerns regarding the potential drawbacks of encouraging greater Member State participation in the listing process, he stressed that the definition of Al-Qaida should remain loose in order to ensure that the group's operations were circumscribed to the maximum extent possible. Once the Coordinator had concluded, the Chairman proposed

that the report should be released in its current form to non member States and to the mass media. No objections were raised to the suggested course of action.

8. Under other matters, the United Kingdom noted that it had proposed an amendment to the letter concerning the Committee's response to the **notification by Malaysia concerning an exception** from the financial sanctions in accordance with resolution 1452 (2002). The amendment sought to reaffirm that, as a matter of principle, the Committee should receive sufficient information with regard to credit card expenses to ascertain whether an exception should be permitted under paragraph 1(a) or 1(b) of that resolution. The Chairman noted that the earlier **notification by Germany concerning an exception** in accordance with resolution 1452 (2002) had been approved under the no-objection procedure. The Committee then discussed how to process the 70 names forwarded for inscription on the List through a **communication from Libya**. The Secretariat noted that it had asked for the relevant documents to be translated from the original Arabic within a period of 14 days. Some members suggested that in future Libya and other Member States might be encouraged to submit names in batches, so as not to overwhelm the Committee. Pakistan observed, however, that the Committee should be careful not to dissuade Member States from submitting new names for inscription on the List and noted that Libya had fulfilled its responsibilities in that respect.

9. Before concluding, the Chairman informed the Committee that he was scheduled to give a **briefing to the Security Council** on 13 September and referred to future **travel plans** regarding trips to be undertaken by the Monitoring Team, as well as by himself. In addition he also provided an update on the status of consideration of the Committee's revised **guidelines** and noted that he intended to extend an **invitation** to address the Committee to a well-known expert on Al-Qaida, Professor R.K. Gunaratna (Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore).

Jeremy Farrall
25 August 2004